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FETAL INTERESTS VS. MATERNAL RIGHTS:
IS THE STATE GOING TOO FAR?
INTRODUCTION
Medical evidence has proven that many factors may influence a fetus'
development while it is in its mother's womb.' The growing ability to diagnose
and treat the fetus has engendered a fetal right to begin life with a sound mind
and body.2 Judicial recognition of fetal rights has resulted in attempts to compel
women to consent to medical treatment that their doctors deem to be essential for
their fetus' well being Women who are reluctant to follow medical advice have
been detained in hospitals until the birth of their fetuses.4 Courts have also
punished women's prenatal conduct through civil
5 and criminal liability.6
Part One of this Comment traces the historical development and examines the
current status of fetal rights. Part Two discusses the implications that the courts'
recognition of fetal rights has spawned upon womens' lives. This Comment
concludes that forcing women to undergo medical treatment to benefit their
fetuses both ignores legal precedent and violates the woman's right to privacy and
bodily integrity. The use of civil and criminal sanctions to punish women for
prenatal conduct greatly affects all women while accomplishing nothing in
furtherance of state goals.
PART ONE: RECOGNITION OF FETAL RIGHTS
Property Law
Fetal rights were initially recognized in property law.7 A fetus that was in
existence at the time of a testator's death and that was subsequently born alive
' Drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, ingesting drugs, engaging in sexual intercourse or failing to
discontinue strenuous employment are a few activities that may adversely affect fetal development. R.
STEVENSON, THE FETUs AND NEWLY BORN INFANT: INFLUENCES OF THE PRENATAL ENVIRONMENT 96-
109 (1973).
2 Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 M11. 2d 267, 275, 531 N.E.2d 355, 358 (1988).
3 See generally, Kolder, Gallagher, Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 N. ENG. J. MED.
1192 (1987) (hereinafter Court-Ordered Interventions).
" See cases and accompanying text cited infra note 26.
5 See case and accompanying text cited infra note 137.
6 See cases and accompanying text cited infra notes 138 & 165. This comment is limited to a discussion
of a pregnant woman's refusal to follow her physician's medical advice. For a complete discussion of
problems associated with drug use during pregnancy see Moss. Substance Abuse During Pregnancy 13
HARV. WoMAN's L.J. 278 (1990) (discussing criminal prosecutions of pregnant women who use drugs).
7 Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene? 23 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 5 n.5 (1984).
See also Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn. 240, 13 A. 414 (1887); Medlock v. Brown, 163 Ga. 520, 136 S.E.
551 (1927); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899).
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was entitled to inherit property equally with its living siblings The common
law permitted courts to appoint guardians to protect the property interests of the
unborn child.9
Criminal Law
Our criminal law has also protected the unborn. The common law recognized
that a fetus may be the victim of murder if it is born alive and then dies from
injuries inflicted upon its mother prior to its birth. 0 Many states have enacted
murder statutes that impose criminal sanctions against third parties for killing a
fetus." Other states have amended their homicide statutes so as to punish the
destruction of a fetus.12 These statutes usually require that the fetus had been
viable and that the perpetrator had intended to kill either the fetus or its
mother. 3
a Comment, Medical Technology And The Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1559 (1990). See also E.
WypysKi, THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN AL. Fpwr STATES 53 (3rd ed. 1976)(discussing fetal rights
in the field of property law); Uniform Probate Code § 2-108 (1969) "Relatives of the decedent conceived
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." Id.
The purpose of recognizing fetal interests in property law is to ensure that children are not inadvertently
omitted from their parent's will. Id.
9 Comment, supra note 8, at 1559.
1" See e.g., Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1898) (man charged with second degree murder in
the death of his child, who was born alive and subsequently died as a result of a beating inflicted upon
its mother while in utero); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa 274 (1856) (recognizing that if a newborn should
die from injuries received while in the womb, the person who inflicted those injuries, with the intent to
cause a miscarriage, shall be charged with murder); Morgan v. State, 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923)
(defendant's murder conviction was reversed where the state failed to prove that the infant was born
alive); State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 343 A.2d 505 (1975) (defendant charged with two counts
of murder in the deaths of his twin infants, who died from injuries they received while in utero), rev'd
on other grounds, 173 N.J. Super. 75, 413 A. 2d 611 (1980).
" See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (1988 &
Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6
(West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32.5-32.8
(West Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1973
& Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108 (1991); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (Michie 1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 585:13 (1986); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-17.1-02. thru -03. (Supp. 1991); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 713 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-23-5 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-17-6 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (West
1982 & Supp. 1991)
12 See e.g., ARI_. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (A)(5) (1989 & Supp. 1991); CAL PENAL CODE § 187
(West 1988 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-201 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (1)(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991)
13 Comment, supra note 8, at 1560. See e.g., statutes cited supra notes 11 and 12. See also Passley v.
State, 194 Ga. 327, 21 S.E.2d 230 (1942); State v. Harness, 280 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1955); Williams v.
State, 34 Ha. 217, 15 So. 760 (1894); People v. Smith, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1495, 234 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1987), cert. denied, Smith v. California, 484 U.S. 866 (1987).
[Vol.24:3 & 4
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Third Party Tort Liability
A fetus' right to pursue a tort claim against a third party has also become
well-settled in the United States. Historically, all courts had denied recovery
because a fetus was deemed to be merely part of its mother, it lacked separate
existence or personality.' 4  Therefore, no independent duty was owed to the
fetus.' 5 "In 1946, ... a federal district court reversed the longstanding tradition
of denying third party tort recovery to fetuses.' 6 To date, most jurisdictions
recognize third party tort actions for prenatal injuries. 17 Other jurisdictions have
gone further, allowing wrongful death actions to be brought when a third party's
actions cause a fetus' stillbirth.'" Some courts have even allowed children to sue
14 See Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884). In Dietrich, a pregnant woman fell on a
defective highway when she was approximately five months pregnant. Id. at 14. The woman's fall
resulted in her fetus' premature birth. Id. at 14-15. Although there was testimony that the infant survived
birth, the court denied recovery for damages in a suit brought by the administrator of the child's estate.
Id. at 15. Dietrich was subsequently overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 Mass. 446, 225
N.E.2d 926 (1967).
15 "[Dietrich] was the first American or English case to rule on the [issue] of tort liability for prenatal in-
juries... [I]t set the tone of judicial opinion for the next sixty years." Annotation, Liability For Prenatal
Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 122, 1226 (1971 & Supp. 1991).
16 Comment, supra note 8, at 1559. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). In Bonbrest
an infant alleged that a doctor's negligence resulted in injury to the infant prior to his birth. Id. at 139.
Bonbrest held that a viable fetus who is injured by a third party's negligence may recover damages for
its injuries. Id. at 142.
17 See e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 333-34, 280 So. 2d 758, 763 (1973); Wilson v. Kaiser
Foundation Hosp., 141 Cal. App. 3d 891, 897, 190 Cal. Rptr. 649, 653 (1983); Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn.
Supp. 139, 147, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (1977); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Day v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hombuckle v. Plantation Pipe
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 504-05, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1956); Wade v. U.S., 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1579
(1990) (interpreting Hawaii law); Amann v. Faidy, 415 IMI. 422, 432, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417-18 (1953);
Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62-63 (N.D. Iowa 1960) (interpreting Iowa law); Damasiewicz v.
Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1951); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., Inc., 352 Mass.
446, 448-49, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967); Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218,
222 (1971); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 1233, 258 S.W.2d 577, 581 (1953); Weaks v. Mounter,
88 Nev. 118, 121-22, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1972) (dicta); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 486, 147
A.2d 108, 110 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 367, 157 A.2d 497,504 (1960); Woods v. Lancet,
303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951); Stetson v. Easterling, 274 N.C. 152, 156, 161 S.E.2d
531, 534 (1968); Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 128-29, 87 N.E.2d 334, 340
(1949); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 697, 291
P.2d 225, 228 (1955); Sinklerv. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267,273-74, 164 A.2d 93,96 (1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille,
101 R.I. 76, 80, 220 A.2d 222, 224 (1966); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 612-13, 138 S.E.2d 42,
44 (1964); Farley v. Mount Mary Hosp. Assoc. Inc., 387 N.W.2d 42, 43 (S.D. 1986); Shousha v.
Matthews Drivurself Serv., Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 396, 358 S.W.2d 471, 476 (1962); Delgado v. Yandell,
468 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971), affd, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1971); Kalafut v.
Gruver, 239 Va. 278, 284, 389 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1990); Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Ranldn, 59 Wash. 2d
288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 838 (1962). Reprinted in part from Comment, Maternal Tort Liability For
Prenatal Injuries, 22 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 747, 754 n.52-58 (1988). See also cases cited infra note 18.
' See e.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 100, 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (1974); Summerfield v.
Superior Court, Maricopa Cty., 144 Ariz. 467, 475, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (1985); Espadero v. Feld, 649 F.
Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Colo. 1986) (interpreting Colorado law); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358,
362, 224 A.2d 406, 408 (1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara Inc., 50 Del. 258, 260, 128 A.2d 557, 558
(1956); Greater Southeast Comm. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C. 1984); Porter v. Lassiter,
Spring, 19911
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for prenatal injuries where the defendant's negligence occurred prior to the child's
conception. 9
PART TWO: CONSEQUENCES OF CREATING A LEGAL DUTY
It is the firmly held belief of some that a woman should subordinate her
right to control her life when she decides to become pregnant or does
become pregnant: anything which might possibly harm the developing
fetus should be prohibited and all things which might positively affect the
developing fetus should be mandated under the penalty of law be it
criminal or civil.20
91 Ga. App. 712, 716, 87 S.E.2d 100, 103 (1955); Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 574, 651 P.2d 11,
15 (1982); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 hM. 2d 368, 375, 304 N.E.2d 88, 92 (1973); Britt v. Sears,
150 Ind. App. 487, 497-98, 277 N.E.2d 20, 27 (1971); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 145-47, 368 P.2d
1, 3 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 906 (Ky. 1955); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633,
639 (La. 1981); Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 183, 198 A.2d 71, 73 (1964); Mone v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 361, 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 132, 188
N.W.2d 785, 786 (1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 371, 38 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1949); Rainey
v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 283, 72 So. 2d 434, 439-40 (1954); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 911
(Mo. 1983); White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 538, 458 P.2d 617, 623-24 (1969); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101
N.H. 104, 107, 135 A.2d 249, 251 (1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 155, 619 P.2d 826,
828-29 (1980), modified, 95 N.M. 147, 619 P.2d 823 (1980); Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862, 865
(N.D. 1984); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 432, 167 N.E.2d 106, 107 (1959); Evans v. Olson,
550 P.2d 924, 928 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 266, 518 P.2d 636, 639
(1974), reh'g denied, 268 Or. 272, 520 P.2d 361 (1974). Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 203, 501 A.2d
1085, 1086-87 (1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 189, 365 A.2d 748, 754 (1976); Fowler
v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 614, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44-45 (1964); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1077
(Utah 1975); Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp., 139 Vt 138, 141, 425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980); Moen v.
Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 598, 537 P.2d 266, 266 (1975); Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 437, 184
S.E.2d 428,434 (1971); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14,22, 148 N.W.2d 107,
112 (1967); At least two other states have reached the same result by statute. See TENN. CODE ANN. §
20-5-106 (1980 & Supp. 1991) and S.D. CoDIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-5-1 (1987) But see Milton v. Cary
Medical Center, 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988) (denying recovery in wrongful death action on behalf of a
fetus); Kuhnke v. Fisher, 210 Mont. 114, 120,683 P.2d 916, 919 (1984) (stillborn child not covered under
wrongful death statute); Smith v. Columbus Comm. Hosp., Inc., 222 Neb. 776,780,387 N.W.2d 490,492
(1986) (denying cause of action to child under wrongful death statute). Reprinted in part from Comment,
supra note 17, at 754 n.52-58. Alaska, Arkansas and Wyoming have not addressed the issue of third
party liability for prenatal injuries.
'9 See e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 III. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977) (allowing child's
action for injuries which resulted from physician's negligent treatment of the plaintiff's mother eight years
prior to conception); See also Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 m. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 945 (1964); Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973). This increased potential for third party liability
encouraged the implementation of fetal protection policies which ban women from the performance of
certain jobs. See e.g., U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated a fetal protection policy that banned women ages sixteen through seventy from jobs which
exposed them to lead); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1984) (court upheld
fetal protection policy which barred pregnant women from working in areas of radiation), reh'g denied,
732 F.2d 944 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (court upheld fetal
protection policy that banned women from jobs which exposed them to harmful toxins), vacated, 767 F.2d
915 (4th Cir. 1984).
20 Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
[Vol.24:3 & 4
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Courts which have recognized fetal rights have articulated "a legal right to
begin life with a sound mind and body.'1 The recognition of this right
necessitates the recognition of a mother's legal duty to create the best possible
prenatal environment.2" While most would agree that the expectant mother has
a moral duty to provide the best possible care for her developing fetus, the
transformation of that moral duty into a legal duty creates many consequences.
Forced Medical Treatment
Courts have forced women to submit to blood transfusions23 and caesarean
sections24 to benefit their fetuses. 25  Women who are reluctant to follow
medical advice have been detained in hospitals until the birth of their fetuses. 26
Results such as these violate the woman's right to privacy and bodily integrity
and place the woman's prenatal activities under public scrutiny.
1. Infringement Upon Right To Privacy And Bodily Integrity
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally recognized a right to
privacy in procreational matters.27  "Closely associated with the right to privacy
21 Id. at 275, 531 N.E.2d 355, 358-59 (1988), citing, Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976);
Womack v. Buchhorn, 384 Mich. 718, 725, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222 (1971); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353,
364-65, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
22 Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 275-76, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
23 Court-Ordered Interventions supra note 3, at 1193 (indicating that two court orders for intrauterine
transfusions were obtained in Colorado); See also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson,
42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964) (ordering a woman in her thirty-second week of pregnancy to undergo
blood transfusions), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Crouse-Irving Ment Hosp. Inc. v. Paddock, 127
Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering woman to undergo blood transfusions during
caesarean section); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (blood
transfusion forced upon woman in her eighteenth week of pregnancy).
" Court-Ordered Interventions supra note 3, at 1193. Fifteen court orders for forced caesareans were
obtained in ten states. Id. Those states are Colorado, Hawaii, nlinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. Id. See also Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Co. Hosp.
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); In re Madyun Fetus, No. 189-86 D.C. Super. Ct. July 26,
1986); In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987), reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. App. 1988),
vacated, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990); North Central Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992-85 (N.Y.
Sup. CL Jan. 6, 1986); In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Jackson County Mich. P. Ct May 24, 1982).
25 But see Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983) (court refused to order a woman, in her
sixteenth week of pregnancy, to undergo a "purse string operation" for the purpose of avoiding a
miscarriage).
26See Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195. A "16-year-old pregnant girl in Wisconsin was
held in secure detention for the sake of her fetus because she tended "to be on the run" and to "lack
motivation or ability to seek prenatal care." Id. The survey also indicated that a Nigerian woman was
cuffed to the four comers of the bed while a caesarean section was performed against her wishes. Id. See
also In re Steven S. 126 Cal App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (woman detained in a psychiatric
hospital until birth of her child).
27 See e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973); Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). "Roe and
Spring, 1991]
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are the rights of bodily integrity and personal security from unwarranted
governmental intrusions. '" 28 The right to bodily integrity is protected by the
Fourth29 and Fourteenth Amendments 3° to the United States Constitution. In the
1970's courts began to extend these concepts to an individual's decision to
decline medical treatment.3' The right to protect one's own body from the
invasion of others is, perhaps, an individual's most significant privacy right.32
In Winston v. Lee,33 the United States Supreme Court refused to force a
robbery suspect to undergo the surgical removal of a bullet from his chest.
4
The court held that the proposed surgery would violate the respondent's right to
be secure in his person." Surgery without the patient's consent, performed
under a general anesthetic involves "virtually total divestment" of the patient's
"ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin. 3 6  Similarly, in
Washington v. Harper,37 the United States Supreme Court held that the "forcible
injection of medication into a non consenting person's body represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty.
38
"Most courts have based [the] right to refuse [medical] treatment ... on the
common law right to informed consent39... and a constitutional privacy right."40
The right to refuse medical treatment is recognized even if refusal of the
treatment causes the patient's death.4 1 Yet, an individual's right to refuse life-
Griswold represent situations in which medical advances were used by the United States Supreme Court
to enhance the liberty rights of women. The forced medical treatment cases, on the other hand, illustrate
the potential dark side of technology." Annas, The Impact of Medical Teclology on the Pregnant
Woman's Right To Privacy, 13 AM. J.L. MED. 213, 226 (1987).
28 Myers supra note 7, at 57-58.
2 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985).
30 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
31 In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976), cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
32 Winston, 470 U.S. at 758.
33 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
34 Id. at 767.
35 id.
36 Id. at 765.
37 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
38 Id. at 229.
39 The Informed Consent Doctrine requires that the physician advise a patient of the risks involved in
undergoing a certain medical procedure as well as the risks of refusing such treatment. 2 J. LEE & B.
LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAw LIABILITY AND LITIGATION, § 25.29-25.30 (Rev. Ed. 1977-1989). After
receiving that information the patient has the right to determine whether or not the surgery will be
performed. Id.
40 Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Dept of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990). See also Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990).
41 Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
[Vol.2 :3 & 4
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saving medical treatment is not absolute.42 State courts have cited four counter-
vailing state interests which may supersede the person's right to refuse life-saving
treatment. These interests include: (1) the protection of dependant third parties;
(2) the preservation of life; (3) the prevention of suicide; and (4) the preservation
of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 3 State courts have erroneously
applied this test to all pregnant women's medical choices, regardless of whether
the woman's refusal of medical treatment will lead to her death."
State courts usually invoke their interest in the protection of dependant third
parties and/or the preservation of life when they regulate the pregnant woman's
medical decisions.43 States may override the pregnant woman's refusal of
medical treatment if her decision will result in the abandonment of her minor
children."
If the pregnant woman has no minor children,47 some courts have considered
the fetus to be the "innocent third party." Those courts have relied upon the
42 id.
43 Id. at 2847-48. The state's interests in preventing suicide and safeguarding the integrity of the medical
profession are irrelevant in cases which involve a pregnant woman's refusal of medical treatment. A.C.,
573 A.2d at 1246. The state's interest in the prevention of suicide does not apply because pregnant
women who refuse medical treatment lack the intent to cause their own death. Id. at 1246 n.12. Most of
the pregnant women who refuse treatment do so for religious reasons. Other women fear the harmful
effects of the compelled treatment. Still others feel the treatment is simply unnecessary and wish to utilize
other alternatives.
44 See e.g., A.C., 573 A.2d at 1240 (performance of the caesarean section was actually calculated to hasten
the mother's death); Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 459 (caesarean ordered although the woman
had 50% chance of surviving vaginal delivery); Madyun, No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986)
(caesarean ordered although the operation compromised the mother's health in order to save the fetus).
4- A.C., 573 A.2d at 1245-46. The United States Supreme Court has not determined the circumstances,
if any, under which a pregnant woman may refuse medical treatment.
" See e.g., Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d at 1008, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900. In Jamaica, a New York trial
court ordered a pregnant patient to undergo a blood transfusion. Id. Preserving the life of the fetus was
the court's primary reason for ordering the blood transfusion. Id. at 1007, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899. However,
the court's decision was also motivated by the mother's need to care for her other minor children. Id.
1008,491 N.Y.S.2d at 900; Crouse-Irving Mem. Hosp. Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d
443 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (a New York trial court ordered blood transfusions for an R.H. negative mother of
newly-born infant to stabilize the mother's condition following the caesarean delivery of her fetus); But
see Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d
562 (1986). In Mercy Hosp, a Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court decision which allowed
a pregnant patient to undergo a caesarean section while refusing blood transfusions for herself. d. at 418,
489 A.2d at 1134. The court reached its decision after finding that the woman's refusal to undergo blood
transfusions following the birth of her fetus would not harm the fetus. Id.The caesarean was preformed
without the need for transfusions. Id. at 412, 489 A.2d at 1131. Both Mrs. Jackson and her fetus survived
the surgery. Id.
47 The state's interest in protecting innocent third parties is least discriminatory as it applies equally to
a nonpregnant female's and male's refusal of medical treatment in a life threatening situation.
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state's interest in preserving "life" to override a pregnant woman's medical
treatment choices.48 Relevant abortion law exposes this reasoning as faulty.
In Roe v. Wade,49 the United States Supreme Court held that the "right of
privacy...is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. 50 The Court held that a fetus is "potential life" and is
not recognized as a "person" in the legal sense. 5' Roe held that a state's interest
in preserving "potential life" becomes compelling in the third trimester of
52pregnancy. States may proscribe third trimester abortions entirely except
where necessary to preserve the health or life of the mother. 3 Although the
United States Supreme Court later held that a state may have a compelling
interest in a woman's fetus prior to its viability,-' the Court has yet to hand
down a decision which requires a woman to jeopardize her own health in order
to protect her fetus." In fact, in Thornburg v. American College of
Obstetricians,56 the Court expressly refused to reach such a conclusion. In
Thornburg the Court found a portion of Pennsylvania's Abortion Act, which
required that any person performing a post viability abortion, use the technique
"which would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted
alive unless that.., technique would present a significantly greater medical risk to
the life or health of the pregnant woman than would another available
43 See Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458. The Georgia Supreme Court ordered a woman, in her
thirty-ninth week of pregnancy, to undergo a caesarean section. Id. at 86-87, 274 S.E.2d at 458. The court
"[found] that as a matter of [law], that the [unborn] child is a human being [who is] fully capable of sus-
taining life independent of the mother." Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459. See also Raleigh, 42 N.J. at 422,
201 A.2d at 537 (ordering blood transfusions for a woman in her thirty-second week of pregnancy to
preserve the life of the unborn child); Jwnaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d at 1007, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899
(ordering blood transfusions for woman in eighteenth week of pregnancy, finding that the state's interest
in a not-yet-viable fetus outweighed the patient's interests).
49 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, a pregnant woman challenged a Texas statute which
criminalized abortion, except where necessary to save the life of the mother. Id. at 120. The U.S. Supreme
Court divided pregnancy into three trimesters holding that a woman could choose to have an abortion
during her first and second trimesters for any reason. Id. at 164. During the third trimester of pregnancy
however, the states could proscribe abortion entirely except in cases where it was necessary to save the
life of the mother. Id. at 164-65.
50 Id. at 153.
"- Id. at 158.
S2 id. at 164-65. Roe found that a fetus is considered viable at approximately twenty-four to twenty-eight
weeks. Id. at 160.
-3 Id. at 164-65.
*4 See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Inc., 492 U.S. 490, 519-20 (1989) (Webster, upheld a
Missouri statute which requires physicians to perform pe-abortion viability tests upon pregnant women
whose fetuses may be twenty or more weeks old). Roe had previously found that viability occurs at
twenty-four weeks and would not allow the state to interfere with the woman's individual decision prior
to that time. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
"Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
Thornburg v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
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method.... 57 The Court held that the act was unconstitutional because it required
a "trade off' between the woman's health and the fetus' survival. 58
State laws currently vary as to when a woman may exercise her right to an
abortion. However, the law is clear that a woman is entitled to an abortion at any
stage of her pregnancy, if an abortion is necessary to preserve her health. The
woman's health should remain paramount in forced medical treatment cases. Both
caesarean sections59 and blood transfusions' pose potentially lethal risks to
women.6' Therefdre, courts should not compel these procedures without the
patient's consent.
In spite of relevant abortion law and a woman's right to privacy and bodily
integrity, courts intervene when they believe that a pregnant woman has made an
unwise decision which will affect her fetus.62 In In re Jamaica Hospital,63 a
hospital obtained a court order which forced a patient who was eighteen weeks
pregnant and in critical condition to submit to blood transfusions. 64 The patient
had refused the transfusions for religious reasons. 65  The New York Supreme
Court held that the transfusions were necessary to stabilize the woman's condition
and to save the unborn child's life.66 Although the fetus was not yet viable, the
court concluded that the woman's religious beliefs could not override the state's
significant interest in protecting the life of a midterm fetus.' The court referred
-7 Id. at 768 n.13.
Id. at 768-69.
5' The maternal mortality rate in caesarean deliveries is significantly higher than that for vaginal
deliveries. J. WILSON, E. CARRINGTON & W. LEDGER, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, 530-31 (7th ed.
1983); See also 5B C. FRANKEL, J. ZIMMERLY & R. PATrERSON, LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, §
37.21, 89 (3rd ed. 1986).
60 The American Red Cross estimates that A.I.D.S. continues to be transmitted to approximately fifty to
five hundred blood transfusion recipients per year. The problem continues because the test which the
American Red Cross utilizes to test blood for A.I.D.S. is unable to detect the disease in newly infected
blood. Unfortunately, a more precise test has not been developed. Telephone interview with Jeffery
McCullough M.D., American Red Cross Blood Services Division, Washington D.C. (February 10, 1991).
61 See supra notes 59 and 60. "Court orders force women to assume medical risks and forfeit their legal
autonomy in a manner not required of men and non-pregnant women." Annas, supra note 27, at 227.
Despite this fact, it is doubtful that these orders violate the equal protection clause. Id. Under current
equal protection analysis, the state's intent to discriminate is lacking. Id. The purpose of these decisions
is to protect the fetus, not to discriminate against pregnant women. Id.
62 Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195. Sufficient time to consider the woman's rights is
rarely available. Id. In 88% of the surveyed cases, court orders were obtained within six hours of the
doctor's request. Id. In 19%, the orders were actually obtained in an hour or less and, at times, by
telephone. Id.
63 In re Jamaica Hospital, 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985).
"I Id. at 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
6 /1d. at 1007, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899. The patient in Jamaica was a Jehovah's Witness. Id. Members of the
Jehovah's Witness faith are prohibited from receiving blood transfusions. Id.
66 Id. at 1007, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
67 id.
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to the fetus as "a human being to whom the court stood in parens patriae."6
The court acknowledged the woman's right to obtain an abortion at that stage in
her pregnancy.69 Yet, the acknowledgment of that right did not affect the
court's decision.
In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Auth.,7° the Georgia
Supreme Court ordered a pregnant woman, who suffered from placenta previa,7'
to undergo a caesarean section.72 The court held that the intrusion into the
woman's life was outweighed by the state's duty to protect*an unborn human
being from a premature death." Similarly, in In re Madyun Fetus,74 the court
ordered a nonconsenting female to submit to a caesarean section." The court
held that the fetus was at much greater risk of dying from infection than its
mother was of dying from a caesarean.76
In In re A.C.,77 perhaps the most disturbing case within this area of the law,
a court ordered the performance of a caesarean section upon a terminally ill
woman. The procedure was calculated to hasten the woman's death, yet to
increase the fetus' chances for survival.78 The patient was in her twenty-sixth
week of pregnancy.79 Surgery was ordered over the objections of the patient,
her husband and her family.80 The fetus died within two hours of the
68Id.
69Id.
70 Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Co. Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) In Jefferson, the
mother was in her thirty-ninth week of pregnancy. Id. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458. Both the mother's and
fetus' interests would have been furthered by the surgery's performance. Id. Instead Jefferson left the
hospital system and delivered safely elsewhere. C. Gorney "Whose Body Is It Anyway? The Legal
Maelstrom That Rages When The Rights of Mothers And Fetus Collide," Washington Post Dec. 13, 1988
at DI (indicating that Jefferson left the hospital and delivered safely elsewhere).
71 Placenta previa is a condition in which a woman's placenta is implanted over the opening of her cervix.
5B C. FRANKEL, J. ZIMERLY & R. PA'rERSON, LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, § 37.15b, 70-71 (3rd
Ed. 1986). This condition is potentially lethal for both the mother and the fetus. Id. In Jefferson,
physicians testified that it was virtually impossible for Mrs. Jefferson's placenta previa to correct itself
prior to delivery. Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
7 Jefferson, 247 Ga. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
' Id. at 87, 274 S.E.2d at 458.
74 In re Madyun Fetus, No. 189-86 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 1986).
75 id.
76 id.
7In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. App. 1987), reh'g granted, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. App. 1988), vacated,
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990).
7 ' A.C., 533 A.2d at 613-14.
79Id. at 612.
so A.C., 573 A.2d at 1239-40.
[Vol.24:3 & 4
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 24 [1991], Iss. 3, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol24/iss3/9
MATERNAL RIGHTS
surgery." The patient's death followed within two days. R2 The caesarean
section was listed as a contributing cause of the young woman's death. 3
In re A.C. held that "a state may infringe upon [a] mother's right to bodily
integrity to protect the health or life of her fetus if to do so will not significantly
affect the health of the mother and if the child has a significant chance of being
born alive."" The court reasoned that "although in some cases the surgery will
result in the mother's death, A.C. had at best two days of sedated life left and any
complications from the caesarean would not significantly affect A.C.'s
condition... .The child, on the other hand, [might survive] delivery, despite the
possibility that it would be born handicapped." 5 This reasoning directly conflicts
with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade, which forbade
the sacrificing of a mother's life for the benefit of her fetus'.
In subsequently vacating this order, the court held that in "virtually all cases",
the pregnant woman must choose the desired medical treatment on behalf of
herself and her fetus.86 If the patient is incompetent, or otherwise unable to give
informed consent to a proposed course of medical treatment, then her decision
must be ascertained through substituted judgment.8 On its face, this decision
seems to respect a woman's individual rights. However, the D.C. Court did not
clearly define the phrase, "in virtually all situations".88 Situations in which the
pregnant patient would lose her freedom of choice remain unclear.
In re A.C. is particularly troublesome because the court followed its own
subjective judgment, thereby refusing to respect the family's privacy. The facts
of In re A.C. parallel those in In re Klein$9. Klein involved a husband who
sought to secure an abortion for his comatose wife." Doctors wanted to treat
"s Id. at 1238. The child's death certificate described the cause of death as "extreme immaturity." C.
Gorney supra note 70.
82 A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238.
s3 Gellman, "D.C. Court Wrestles With Fetal Rights Case: Issue Thrives After Death of Mother, Infant",
The Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1988, at CI.
84 A.C., 533 A.2d at 617 (emphasis added).
83 Id. (emphasis added).
16A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
7
' d. Substituted judgment allows the court to determine what an incompetent individual's decision would
have been under the circumstances. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847, citing, Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737-38, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977). Cruzan held that valid
exercises of substituted judgment on behalf of an incompetent patient may require clear and convincing
evidence of the patient's wishes. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct at 2854.
sSee A.C., 573 A.2d at 1252.
'9 In re Klein, 145 A.D.2d 145, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1989).
90 Id. at 146, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (Klein was approximately seventeen weeks pregnant at the time the
abortion was sought).
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the woman more aggressively, but could not do so until she received an
abortion.9" Mr. Klein was forced to fight pro-life advocates through three levels
of the court system to secure his wife's abortion.92 In allowing the abortion to
be performed, the New York Court of Appeals stated that the pro-life advocates
were "absolute strangers to the Klein family...[who had] no place in the midst of
[the Klein] family tragedy. 9 3
A.C. and Klein signify that a fetus' health interests should never supersede
those of the mother's. In forced medical treatment cases, strangers are permitted
to interfere in private family decisions.
2. Right To Abort Versus Duty To Ensure Health
It is inconsistent to find that a woman has both the right to abort her fetus and
a "legal duty" to ensure that it is born healthy. Fetal advocates argue that if a
woman chooses to become pregnant and subsequently waives her right to an
abortion, she has an enhanced duty to ensure that her fetus enters the world as a
healthy child.94  This reasoning ignores the differences among women's
circumstances. Not every woman who becomes pregnant chooses to do so. Some
pregnancies result from rape, incest or failed birth control.95 Even in situations
where the expectant mother makes a conscious choice to become pregnant she
cannot be expected to bring her child into the world at all costs. One cannot be
made aware of all the possible complications which may arise. Furthermore, a
woman cannot be said to have waived her right to an abortion if her pregnancy
is within the permissible time frame where that alternative is still an option.
3. No Right To Withhold Medical Treatment From A Child
Fetal rights advocates contend that courts may override pregnant women's
"unwise" medical decisions because parents may not withhold medical treatment
from their children. 96 In Prince v. Massachusetts,97 the Court stated, "Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow that they are
free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they
91 Id.
92id.
93 Id. at 148-49, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 276.
" See e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty And The Control Of Conception, Pregnancy And Childbirth,
69 VA. L REV. 405, 456 (1983) (suggesting that the right to abort the fetus may not include the lesser
right of injuring it); King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal For Legal Protection of the
Unborn, 77 Mict. L. REV. 1647 (1979).
9" Comment, supra note 8, at 1644.
96 See e.g., Robertson, supra note 94, at 444; Myers, supra note 7, at 21.
9' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice
for themselves."98
Some jurisdictions have extended this doctrine to cover unborn children.99
It has been argued that the pregnant woman who refuses treatment for herself also
refuses treatment for her unborn child.'t°  The two situations are not
synonymous.' A court order which forbids a mother to prevent a living
child's medical treatment does not affect the mother's bodily integrity.' °2 Much
more analogous to a pregnant woman's situation is a person's refusal to donate
needed body organs.'03 It has been held that a person may not be forced to
donate necessary body organs, even if that person is the only compatible donor.
In McFall v. Shimp,' ° a Pennsylvania District Court refused to compel a
relative of a person who suffered from a rare bone marrow disease to submit to
a bone marrow transplant, even though the disease victim would die without the
transplant.'0 5 The court cited "the common law rule which provides that one
human being is not obligated to aid, assist, or rescue another."'16 The court in-
sisted that this rule must be upheld even when it is morally "harsh or
revolting."1"7 The court concluded, "[Flor our law to compel the defendant to
submit to an intrusion of his body would change every concept and principal
upon which our society is founded....To do so would defeat the sanctity of the
individual and would impose a rule which would know no limit and one could
not imagine where the line would be drawn."'08
More recently in Curran v. Bosze,"'9 a mother refused to allow her three and
one-half year old twins to undergo a bone marrow harvesting procedure for the
9, Id. at 170.
99 See e.g., A.C., 533 A.2d at 616, citing, Raliegh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537 (1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Co. Hosp.
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898
(1985); Crouse-Irving Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 127 Misc. 2d 101, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1985); In
re Madyun Fetus, No. 189-86 (July 26, 1986).
'0 Robertson, supra note 94, at 444.
'01 A.C., 533 A.2d at 616.
I" Id. at 617 (emphasis added).
' Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1194.
'0' McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (1978).
'05 Id. at 90-91. See also In re George, 630 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (court refused to order
alleged biological father of leukemia patient to undergo bone marrow harvesting procedure for patient's
benefit).
'06 McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d at 91.
17 id.
los Id.
10 Curran v. Bosze, 141 II. 2d 473, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (1990).
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benefit of their half brother t l The father of all three of the children requested
the twins' cooperation after all other possible donors were found to be
incompatible."' The Illinois Supreme Court refused to order the twins to
submit to the testing.' 12 The court held that ordering the twins to undergo the
bone marrow harvesting procedure would not be in the twins best interests." 3
The court concluded that although the boy's situation is tragic, it would not be
proper under existing law to order such treatment." 4
Recognizing this concept, a Washington state judge refused to order a
caesarean section against a pregnant woman's wishes." 5 The judge stated "I
would not have the right to require a woman to donate an organ to one of her
other children, if that child were dying ...I cannot require her to undergo [a] major
medical procedure for [her fetus]."" 6
Ordering a pregnant woman to undergo a surgical procedure for the benefit
of her fetus is more unjust than requiring a living person to undergo a surgical
procedure for the benefit of another. "A legal duty to guarantee the mental and
physical health of another has never been recognized in the law.""'  Since
courts often order pregnant women to submit to medical treatment, a fetus, in
effect, possesses more rights than does a living individual." 8
4. Physicians' Attitudes & Medical Uncertainty
Physicians' attitudes toward expectant mothers and the uncertainty of
medicine further complicate this issue. Medical professionals recognize the fetus
as their "second patient" and often wish to protect the fetus from the potentially
harmful consequences of its mother's choices." 9 They, therefore, seek to save
two people: the mother and the fetus. 20 Physicians also contend that they fear
"0 Id. at 475, 566 N.E.2d at 1321.
.. Id. at 476, 566 N.E. 2d at 1321.
112 Id. at 527, 566 N.E.2d at 1345.
13 id.
114 id.
". Court-Ordered Interventions supra note 3, at 1194.
16 Id. The physician's prediction of harm to the fetus proved inaccurate in this instance. Id. at 1195. The
child was born healthy. Id.
117 Stallman, 125 l. 2d at 276, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
"' C. Gorney, supra note 70 (quoting Lynn Paltrow of the American Civil Liberties Union).
"9 See e.g., Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1193. See also C. Gomey, supra note 70 ("A
pregnant woman...does not have the right to be treated by law and society as though she is the only
person inside her skin until the moment her baby emerges...." The article quotes one doctor as stating: "I
cannot let something happen to one patient because of what someone else wants to do").
'2 Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1193. Forty-six percent of fellowships program
chairpersons in maternal-fetal medicine agreed that mothers who refuse medical advice and who thereby
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legal action if they fail to provide medical treatment to the pregnant woman.121
For these reasons, physicians often disregard the mother's interests and seek court
orders to compel refused treatment which they believe to be essential.'2
While the medical profession may be well-intentioned, physicians cannot be
permitted to ignore a pregnant woman's legal rights.123 The risks which
accompany medical treatment and the imprecise nature of science should compel
the courts to refuse to order pregnant women to undergo unwanted medical
procedures."
A New England Journal of Medicine survey found that doctors inaccurately
predicted harm to the fetus in six cases in which court-ordered caesarean sections
were sought.125 In several instances women left the hospital system when
confronted with the threat of forced medical treatment 26 Some of the women
involved in those circumstances delivered safely elsewhere, despite their doctor's
warnings that the health of both the mother and the fetus were in danger.
1 27
Courts often justify their errors as unfortunate byproducts of medical
uncertainty while disregarding the ramifications their decisions have upon
women. 28  Not only may court regulation of pregnant women's lives endanger
the health and safety of women it may also jeopardize doctor-patient
relationships. 29  Hospitals' public images may be adversely affected.
1 31
endanger the life of their fetus should be detained in hospitals or other facilities for treatment. Id.
121 Cour-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195. Physicians argue that they are in a double bind
in these situations. Id. They face possible lawsuits from a child injured by a physician's decision not to
override the mother's choice as well as for performing a medical procedure without the mother's consent.
Id. Obtaining a court order may be in the physician's best interests. Id. But see Court-Ordered
Interventions, supra note 3, at 1196 (indicating that"none of the [surveyed] doctors knew of a case in
which a doctor had been sued for failure to seek a court order." However, two of the surveyed doctors
were aware of cases in California and Michigan where women sued their doctor following the
performance of a court-ordered medical procedure). See also "Family Wins Settlement Over Forced
Caesarean" Los Angeles Times (November 29, 1990) (following the decision in A.C., the surviving family
members sued the hospital and physicians for performing a caesarean on A.C. against her wishes. The
family was successful in their suit and won an undisclosed amount in damages).
'2 Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1193.
123 "Doctors have a very deep obligation to convince [the pregnant woman] differently if they believe she
is wrong but that obligation does not extend to forcibly overriding her ultimate decision" C. Gomey,
supra, note 70 (quoting Lynn Paltrow of the American Civil Liberties Union).
' Court Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195.
12 id.
'6 Id. at 1193. See also C. Gomey supra note 70 (indicating that the patient in Jefferson left the hospital
and delivered her child without complications).
"z Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195.
121 Id.
129 Id.
,1 Id. at 1196. 15
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Women may begin giving birth to their babies outside the hospital system.' 3 t
"Because neither doctors nor patients can make entirely informed and accurate
risk-benefit calculations and because the mother will ultimately be...most affected
by...her choices, she must...make the initial decision."'132 When the mother
makes an unwise decision, it is an isolated error and one from which she will
most likely learn. 33  When the courts make unwise decisions, those decisions
become legal precedent and, consequently, affect many people. 34 Furthermore,
"[a]cceptance of forced caesarean sections, hospital detentions and intrauterine
transfusions may trigger demands for court ordered prenatal screening, fetal
surgery, and restrictions on the diet, work, athletic activity, and sexual activity of
pregnant women."' 35 Threats to a woman's privacy in these forms should not
be considered unimaginable. Once courts have allowed major surgery to be
performed against a woman's will, these more subtle restrictions will most likely
be viewed as "less invasive and burdensome."
1 36
Civil and Criminal Liability
Some states have imposed civil 37 and criminal 3 sanctions upon women
whose prenatal activities endanger their fetuses regardless of whether or not those
activities were intentional. Decisions such as these impose sanctions upon women
for actions that may be beyond their control and therefore punish women for
simply possessing childbearing capacity.
131 id.
132 Comment, supra note 8, at 1583.
"3 C. Gorney, supra note 70.
'34 Rhoden, The Judge In The Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesarean 74 CAL L
REv. 1951, 1953 (1986). "It is far better that some tragic private wrongs transpire than that state-imposed
coercion of pregnant women become part of our legal landscape." Id.
'35 Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195. This concept is particularly frightening. "In light
of present knowledge, forcing a woman in the 1960's to ingest widely-accepted medication, such as
thalidomide, would now seem unfair." Comment supra note 8, at 1583. Moreover each person's individual
circumstances may pose more personal risks. For example, one woman refused a caesarean section due
to concerns that her obesity would heighten her risks of developing complications. Bowes & Selgestad
Fetal Versus Maternal Rights Medical and Legal Perspectives 58 Obstetrics and Gynecology 209, 211
(1981). The court disregarded her concerns and ordered her to undergo the operation. Id.
'36 Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 3, at 1195. At least one commentator disagrees stating that
.mere trivial interventions...may require more massive privacy invasion than one-time surgery." Annas,
supra note 27, at 228.
13 See e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980); See also Grodin discussed
infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
'3' See e.g., People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987) (woman arrested
and imprisoned for failing to follow her doctor's medical advice following newborn's death).
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1. Civil Liability
If a mother's moral duty to her fetus is transformed into a legal duty a child
injured in utero would be permitted to sue its mother for damages. In Grodin v.
Grodin 39 the Michigan Court of Appeals sustained a minor son's action against
his mother for damages which resulted from his mother's use of tetracycline
during pregnancy.14° Grodin ingested the drug after physicians advised her that
she was not pregnant.14' After another physician examined Grodin and advised
her that she was seven or eight months pregnant, Grodin refrained from using the
drug. 42 The court reversed summary judgment in favor of the mother and
remanded the case to the trial level to assess the "reasonableness" of the mother's
conduct during her pregnancy.14  In doing so, the court held that the child's
mother's liability for negligent conduct resembled a third person's liability.'"
Therefore, if the mother's prenatal conduct was found to be "unreasonable," a
fetus injured by that conduct would be permitted to recover damages for its
injuries.
In Stallman v. Youngquist,145 the Illinois Supreme Court criticized Grodin
for failing to recognize the profound implications that parental liability for
prenatal injury would impose upon all women." In Stallman, the plaintiff
sought to recover against her mother for injuries which she sustained in an auto
accident when she was in her fifth month of gestation. 47 The court refused to
recognize a cause of action by or on behalf of the child and, consequently,
granted summary judgment for the mother. 48 The Stallman court stated, that,
"holding a third person liable for prenatal injuries furthers the interests of both the
mother and the subsequently born child and does not interfere with the
defendant's right to control his or her own life.'49 The relationship between a
pregnant woman and her fetus is unlike the relationship between any other
plaintiff and defendant. 50  No other defendant must go through biological
39 Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
'40 Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
141 Id. at 398, 301 N.W.2d at 869.
142 id.
"3Id. at 401, 301 N.W.2d at 871. See also Mayberry v. Pryor, 134 Mich. App. 826, 832-33, 352 N.W.2d
322,324-25 (1984) (criticizing Grodin as incorrect and holding that the "reasonableness" of one's parental
conduct is a question of law).
Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 400, 301 N.W.2d at 870.
"4 Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988).
'46 Id. at 274, 531 N.E.2d at 358.
' Id. at 268, 531 N.E.2d at 355.
"' Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
'
49 Id. at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
130 Id.
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changes of the most profound type possibly at the risk of her own life, in order
to bring an adversary into the world."' 51  The court concluded, "[I]t is the
mother's every waking and sleeping moment which for better or worse shapes the
prenatal environment which forms the world for the developing fetus...[t]hat this
is so is not a pregnant woman's fault it is a fact of life."'5 2
The Grodin and Stallman decisions also reflect Michigan's and Illinois' views
on parental tort immunity. The state of Michigan has abolished its parental
immunity doctrine and, therefore, allows minors to sue their parents. 53 Grodin
has been interpreted to extend that right to fetuses.' - In contrast, Illinois has
not abolished its parental immunity doctrine. 55 Stallman expressly refused to
comment on the doctrine's status. 56
2. Criminal Liability
At least one state has employed the criminal law to punish a woman for her
allegedly unreasonable conduct during pregnancy' 57 Pamela Stewart was
arrested and imprisoned after she failed to follow "doctor's orders."'58 Stewart
was informed that she had placenta previa, as a result she was advised to avoid
drugs, to stay off her feet, to avoid sexual intercourse, and to seek immediate
medical attention if she began to hemorrhage. 59  Stewart ignored this
advice. 6° Her son was bom with massive brain damage, and died six weeks
151 Id.
'52 Id. at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 360. The Stallman court stated: "The error that a fetus cannot be harmed in
a legally cognizable way has been corrected...the law will not now make an error of a different sort, one
with enormous implications for all women...." Id. at 276-77, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
'" See Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1. 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). In Plumley, the personal representatives
of the estate of four deceased children brought an action against the estate of their deceased mother for
the mother's negligence which resulted in their deaths. Id. at 3, 199 N.W.2d at 170-71. The administrator
of the mother's estate argued that the representatives of the childrens' estates were barred from recovery
by the parental immunity doctrine. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court held that "a child may maintain a
lawsuit against his parent for injuries suffered as a result of alleged ordinary negligence of the parent
except where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child
or where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable discretion with respect to provisions
of food [and] clothing...." Id. at 4, 199 N.W.2d at 172-73.
'45 Stallman, 125 Il. 2d at 274, 531 N.E.2d at 358.
', See Eisele v. Tenuta, 83 I1. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349 (1980).
"'Stallman, 125 IMl. 2d at 269, 531 N.E.2d at 355.
157 See People v. Pamela Rae Stewart, No. M508197 (San Diego Mun. Ct. 1987).
'm Comment, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case and Fetal Harm: Prosecution Or Prevention? 11 HARV.
WOMEN'S LJ. 227, 229 (1988) (Stewart became the first woman in the United States to be charged with
criminal liability for prenatal conduct).
'59 Id. at 228.
' Id. Stewart's hospital records indicate that Stewart engaged in sexual intercourse, discontinued her
medication, ingested drugs and failed to arrive at the hospital for several hours after she began
hemorrhaging. Id. at 228-29.
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later.1 6' Stewart was charged with violating California's child abuse statute' 62
which provides:
If a parent of a minor child willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to
furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other
remedial care for his or her child, he or she is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars.... or by
imprisonment [for up to one year] ...A child conceived but not yet born is
to be deemed an existing person insofar as this section is concerned...
63
The trial judge dismissed the charges against Stewart after he determined
that this statute did not apply to Stewart's prenatal conduct.'" Since the
Stewart case, criminal prosecutions for the mistreatment of fetuses has
dramatically risen.
1 65
CONCLUSION
The state's interest in favoring healthy newborns should not compel a
pregnant woman to forfeit her legal rights to privacy and bodily integrity. Forced
medical treatment violates those rights and affords a fetus with greater rights than
those of a living person.
"The circumstances in which each individual woman brings forth life are as
varied as the circumstances of each woman's life."" 6 While the birth of healthy
babies is an important goal, involuntary medical treatment and after-the-fact civil
or criminal liability for individual mothers will not effectuate that goal.' 67
6Id. at 229.
'Id.
'm CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)
164 Comment, supra note 158, at 230. The court found that the language which included the fetus was
intended to reach men who refused to support the women whom they impregnate. Id. at 230 n.26.
Following the Stewart case, legislation was introduced in California that would criminalize Stewart's
conduct. Id. at 231. That legislation was later withdrawn and, to date, has not been reintroduced. Id. at
231 n.34.
16 See e.g., Lewin, "Drug Use In Pregnancy: New Issue For The Courts" New York Times Feb. 5, 1990
at A14 (noting that criminal charges have been filed in approximately thirty-five drug and alcohol abuse
cases across the country). Some states which prosecute women for delivering illegal drugs to their fetuses
include: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio and South
Carolina. Moss, supra note 6, at 279-85, citing, People v. K.H., No. 89-2931-FY (Mich. Dist. CL
Muskegon County arraignment on Nov. 13, 1989); Foster, Fetal Endangerment Cases Increase, Christian
Science Monitor, Oct. 10, 1989, at 8 (describing incidents of arrest in Ohio and Indiana) See also M.
Martin, "Pregnant Woman Charged Drug Use Cited As Danger To Fetus" The Cleveland Plain Dealer,
July 2, 1991 at I-A, col. 1 & 5-A, cols. 5 & 6.
'66 Stallman, 125 111. 2d at 279, 531 N.E.2d at 360.
67 id.
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Rather, "before-the-fact" education of all women and families about prenatal
development will most effectively further the state's objectives.1
With the erosion of Roe,1 9 women may lose the right to control their
reproductive lives. Decisions that continue to place fetal interests above maternal
rights ensure that women will also be forced to subject themselves to state
regulation during their pregnancies. State regulation of pregnancy will continue
to force pregnant women to jeopardize their health and in some instances their
lives in order to ensure their fetuses' survival.
ROBIN M. TRINDEL
I d. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
10 See, Roe and accompanying text cited supra notes 49-53.
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